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Energy and Globalisation: Oil and
Gas in China
Alain Sepulchre
1 All the evidence, from news desk analysis about oil and gas in China to the incredible
growth that China has experienced in the ten years from 1990 to 2000,  points to a
Chinese energy scene that is already “global”. Selective macro data and investigative
reports show China to be a new global partner in this industry. Yet, critical factors
show a country not truly engaged in a definite globalisation process. 
2 With a daily production of 3.3 million barrels of oil (bpd) and a consumption of 5.45
million bpd, in 2003 China was the sixth biggest producer and the second biggest oil
consumer in the world. Its fast-growing and unequalled demand for massive imports
makes China an important actor. Yet its position in the global oil market, dominated by
major oil-supply countries and global companies, does not appear so important.
3 With  the  emergence  of  its  three  big  oil  &  gas  companies–CNPC  (China  National
Petroleum Corporation), Sinopec Group (China Petroleum and Chemical Company) and
CNOOC (China National Offshore Company) 1–a comprehensive process of local industry
reshuffling  and  restructuring  has  been  taking  place  to  establish  an  industry  that
reflects the values of a market economy system. Its potential to tap foreign investment
and build the biggest ever oil derivatives market along global standards is perceived to
be  limitless.  Yet  its  domestic  market  fundamentals  appear  as  yet  in  early  to  mid-
transition  from  a  base  of  heavy  state  interventionism  and  protectionism  and  only
marginally  integrating  the  emerging  presence  of  the  oil  giants:  ExxonMobil,  Shell,
British Petroleum (BP), Total and ChevronTexaco 2.
4 In 2000 to 2001 the three Chinese companies successfully entered the international
financial and business market with their IPO (Initial Public Offer 3)–PetroChina, Sinopec
Corporation and CNOOC Limited. China owns now a trio of globalisable champions: a
highly  unique  situation.  Yet  a  fair  comparative  assessment  of  their  performances
versus those of the majors offers a long list of medium-performing characteristics and
profiles, not fully in line with international standards and benchmarks.
Definition and scope of globalisation: three perspectives 
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5 Globalisation  has  been  variously  defined,  reflecting  in  part  different  disciplinary
assumptions.  An  interdisciplinary  group  has  recently  offered  a  comprehensive
definition of globalisation as “comprising a host of facts and observations such as the
accelerated  growth  of  world  trade  and  investment  since  the  mid-80s,  the  global
distribution of the value-added chain of companies or the global integration of money
and capital markets. Yet globalisation is not only an economic phenomenon, but rather
includes...the emergence of other social values and ways of life”4.
6 We additionally call upon the integrative theoretical work of John Child. His conceptual
analysis  of  a  trans-national  organisational  framework  implicated  by  a  globalisation
context5 assess  the  critical  attributes  of  globalisation  through  a  three-systems
approach–material, institutional and ideational. Similarly he characterises the vector
of changes within globalisation along this triple identities perspective.
7 Accordingly, we propose to investigate globalisation along a triple perspective. Firstly,
a macroeconomic perspective will capture the situation and positioning of China in the
energy world scene. 
8 Secondly, a China or “domestic” perspective will  relate its specific local oil  and gas
framework and playing field vis-à-vis the so-called material identities6. Our aim is to
measure  the  place  and role  of  economic  and market  fundamentals–such as  market
structure and efficiency, price fixing mechanisms, technology standards, competition
standpoint–as well as to integrate the impact of major exogenous sources of material
changes  emerging  from  the  majors and  from  other  international  investments  in
addition to emerging WTO regulations.
9 Thirdly, a comparative performances analysis between the three domestic champions
and the majors (and some regional competitors) will be set up. A valuation process will
be elaborated to position them vis-à-vis some global business institutional rules such as
corporate governance and a normative matrix organisational system. Similarly, their
standpoint  vis-à-vis  some  global  business  values  phenomena  such  as  quality  and
consumer-driven corporate policy and a  social  environment promoting meritocracy
and responsibility will be reviewed.
A macro-perspective: scenarios for four globalisation processes
10 China stands today as the second largest energy consumer–after the USA–and the third
largest  energy  producer–behind  the  USA  and  Russia.  China  is  also  number  one
producer of coal and number two in installed power generation. Its massive growth
requirement projections estimated by various sources put it as being potentially the
largest market for energy products, services and technology and confirmed to be the
biggest incremental source of energy demand for the 2000 to 2020 period taking about
23% of the world total7. Its primary energy demand jumped from 864 million tons of oil
(Mtoe) in 1995 to 2.1 billion tons in 2020, which will significantly increase its global
power, representing 11% of the global market in 1995 and up to 16% in 2020. These
figures  legitimise  China’s  uncontested  presence  within  the  worldwide  energy
framework.
Coal, the uncontested leader in a “low context” globalisation process
11 Table 1, a detailed investigation through the spectrum of primary sources of energy 8
shows  a  contrasting  picture  among  the  four  different  types;  and  accordingly,  four
specific and distinct areas of globalisation.
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12 Through its recent history China has uniquely been dependant on its domestic coal to
supply most of its energy demand. This makes it the most dependant of any nation,
currently  70%  dependence  (down  from  95%  in  the  1950s),  as  well  as  the  largest
producer  and  consumer  of  coal  worldwide.  Future  projections  indicate  a  sustained
dominance  although slightly  down,  to  about  66% in  2020.  Coal  production  (26% in
worldwide figures in 2001) 9,  and reserves being plentiful (third largest worldwide),
self-sufficiency has been and will be granted for decades, theoretically putting China in
a very reassuring and comfortable position of not needing to go global. Presumably as
well,  it  guarantees  comprehensive  autonomy  and  independence  in  both  business
management  and  political  leadership,  therefore  implying  massive  and  long-term
protectionism and some state-owned type of governance. 
 
China energy needs (primary and secondary sources)
NB: * Commercial value only.
Sources: International Energy Agency (IEA), Developing China’s Gas Market, Energy Policy Challenges,
OECD, 2002. HEC Eurasia, La Grande Muraille de charbon, l’énergie en Chine au XXIe siècle, HEC Eurasia
Institute, Paris, 1999. IEA, China Worldwide Quest for Energy Security, IEA Press, 1999. Standard &
Poor’s, World Energy Service Asia Paciﬁc Outlook, Hong Kong, 1999. State Development Planning
Commission (SDPC) data and personal documents. All pourcentages are a mix of those sources.
13 But China’s coal industry appears no more completely disconnected from the global
energy system with regard to other domestic primary sources of energy. Three of its
fundamental  characteristics  handicap  and  counteract  its  contemplated  isolation
capability on paper. A first issue lies in the poor values of the domestic feedstock, both
intrinsic and in terms of apparatus, and both reflecting a comparative heavy polluting
effect and high average extraction and production costs due to the inefficiencies of the
local  mines.  A  second issue  lies  in  localisation and material  balance  defects  as  the
industry is concentrated in the north and west while demand is concentrated in the
south and east. The third and final issue lies in the unstable obligation falling upon
some export transactions to alleviate production imbalance risk, but without creating
overwhelming repercussions for international prices–China being the second largest
exporter in 2002. 
14 These  issues  have  three  negative  consequences.  The  most  important  is  a  gradual
relative loss of  its  competitiveness and attractiveness (once all  costs are taken into
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account  following  accepted  accountable  Western  techniques),  versus  the  more
“modern”  and  much  less  polluting  sources  of  energy  that  carry  with  them  fewer
logistic constraints in terms of transportation, and which are now in greater and more
available supply. Another damaging loss of appeal questions its traditional supporting
feedstock role supplying the bulk (about three-quarters) of electricity production. Its
ability  or  inability  to  face  booming  electricity  demands  in  coastal  areas  that  are
outstripping  a  bottlenecked  transportation  and  supply  chain,  creating  shortages  as
experienced during some peak times during 2003 10 are re-emerging as a contingent
matter of concern now 11, presents another consideration. Finally, its declining position
as  a  reliable  leading  supplier  to  overseas  markets  is  taking  its  toll  through  the
accumulated effect of the previous two impacts, de facto institutionalising a situation
prioritising domestic concerns 12 against global market supply and demand patterns.
15 Important measures to correct this three-point situation have been taken since the
mid-  to  late  1990s.  Among  them,  the  most  “global”  refer  to  closure  of  the  most
uncompetitive sites (mainly a vast number of  small  operations) and to the planned
industry  consolidation  under  the  authority  of  the  China  Coal  Industry
Association―including a master project to set up eight to ten giant enterprises 13. A key
number of actions such as fundamental technology upgrades and technology transfers
(i.e.  coal  gasification and coal-bed methane processes)  as  well  as  innovative  supply
chain improvements (such as coal-fired power plants) are also under implementation
in  association  with  massive  infrastructure  work  (ongoing  renovation  and
modernisation of rail, marine and road networks). Additionally, programmes are being
set  up  for  elementary  environmental  protection  and  social  safety–both  aiming  at
drastic reductions in emissions.
16 Overall, such “low-context globalisation” macro processes are made up of challenging
steps and initiatives,  within a domestic context dominantly “local”,  to transform as
much as to elevate coal industry assets and its value chain to bring it in line with global
partners/competitors and standards.
Oil–a medium-context process
17 Oil accounts for about 25% of China’s energy, and shows a highly contrasting picture to
gas in terms of globalisation.
18 On  the  one  hand, China’s  consistent  growth  in  GDP  has  been  fuelling  increasing
demand for oil 14 which an ill-developing domestic industry, facing at best since the late
1990s a plateau in production capacity, is unable to meet. This lack of growth in the oil
sector is related in part to the forced decline (3% to 5% yearly) of its major oil
production area of Daqing (representing about 30% of its total production output), and
in  part  to  the  limited  and  marginally  over-compensating  output  delivered  15 by
emerging production from vast yet remote sources in China’s west and some promising
off-shore fields. It is also due to the insularity of its industry, which has been unable to
protect its resources from international influence and which has kept it from forging
significant  foreign  alliances,  by  which  the  industry  could  progress  through  the
implementation of up-to-date technologies or production-sharing stimuli partnerships
16. 
19 The  expanding  oil  deficit  is  leading  China  to  become vulnerable  to  increasing  and
massive import requirements: the ratio of imports to total demand, negligible up to the
late 1990s, was suddenly at about 30% in 2003 (at a record 91 millions tons, rising 31%
over 2002 17), and is forecast to climb to 50% within a decade (and to 80% by 2030 18). In
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absolute terms, China’s domestic net imports were about 15% of US imports in 2001 and
are  likely  to  be  about  60%  in  2030  19.  This  incredible  and  apparently  unnoticed
deterioration in both the energy balance ratio and in the figures involved have obliged
the local  oil  companies to search very vigorously for overseas sources of  supply to
secure  strategic  reserves  and  help  level  up  this  highly  uncomfortable  position  of
imbalance. 
20 Concomitantly,  this  compulsory move towards some globalisation and “courting oil
diplomacy” is observed as to be rather mono-directional as, on the other side, this call
to embed China in the oil  globalisation process has been attracting mute responses
from the majority of the current giants, being supply countries or oil majors, with the
relative exception of Russian and neighbouring republics keen to secure political and
business presence into the cross-countries pipelines affairs.
21 Although both  the  top  state  authority  20 and  the  three  domestic  oil  companies  (in
addition  to  Sinochem  21)  have  been  leading  comprehensive  campaigns  to  invest  in
overseas  oil  fields  and  to  sign  some  fixed  long-term  purchasing  agreements,  few
significant deals  have been working out successfully (CNPC/PetroChina intakes into
Sudan and Ecuador (major stakes or operatorship in oil fields), Sinopec in Azerbaijan
and Saudi Arabia (co-development deal) and CNOOC in Indonesia (assets buy-back)). For
an official FDI (foreign direct investment) amount of about US$4 billion spread across
20 countries 22 and representing about 15% of the domestic players’ total production
capabilities 23,  those investments are dwarfed by the bulk of oil exchange concluded
under  straightforward  trading  contracts  and  implicating  Middle-East  producers  in
about  40%-50% of  the  total  supply  (Africa  about  25%-35%).  China,  unlike  Russia  or
promising countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Venezuela or the Caspian Sea republics,
offers  no  exciting  or  valuable  potential  in  oil  exploration  and  production  (E&P)
activities  and  accordingly  is  strategically  more  considered  as  a  second-tier  oil
investment-driven  partner.  The  refusal  of  the  oil  majors  under  the  Caspian  Sea
Exploration  Consortium  in  early  2003  to  accept  both  Sinopec  and  CNOOC  as
replacement partners in one of the largest oil reserve areas in the world–the Kashagan
field in Kazakhstan–using their pre-emptive rights is one of the most striking cases.
22 At the same time, the importance of China’s trading and derivatives markets is clearly
of great significance, these being a major factor of influence in international pricing
fluctuations. This makes China an indispensable partner. A few domestic deals―in the
Tarim Basin and offshore territories (Bohai and South China Seas)–and international
agreements–  i.e.,  recently  Saudi  Arabia  and  Yemen  formed  joint  ventures  now
becoming operational,  while  others  are  under  discussion.  On the  non-Chinese  side,
those deals aim at securing access to privileged areas of high growth oil derivatives
markets in addition at building limited but profitable exposure to local E&P.
23 This illustrates a second globalisation process viewed as “medium-context”, being the
juxtaposition of primary global concerns from a China supply perspective and
secondary  concerns  from the  outside  world  more  interested  in  China  demand and
consumer markets reservoirs.
Gas–a “high-context” process
24 The Chinese gas  industry (and gas  and oil  pipelines)  is  subject  to  a  “high-context”
globalisation process.  China wants  to  become a  true global  player  fully  recognised,
inter-connected and integrated, both on natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG)
feedstock, both on domestic and international fronts, and on gas and oil pipelines and
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gas fields projects. Historically, natural gas has been a minor fuel primarily consumed
as a feedstock for fertiliser plants with little usage for electricity generation, which
accounts for a small 2% of the total energy balance. But recent reassessment of three
fundamental parameters have led China to embark on a massive three-pillar strategy of
promotion, build-up and operation of gas and oil pipelines projects. 
25 Firstly,  China’s  substantial  proven reserves have been reassessed at  150-200 trillion
cubic feet (tcf) or 5% only of the estimated potential, giving substantial credit to a solid
domestic-based industry. Second, key emerging climate and pollution environmental
concerns are clearly influencing the current debate in favour of less polluting fossil
fuels such as natural gas. Lastly, there is a determination to lower over-dependence on
both  coal  and  imported  oil  by  ships―associated  to  the  geo-political  risk.  This
innovative policy contains a primary objective―to double the share of its gas usage by
2010 (production to rise to about 7.2 tcf from 2 tcf currently), aiming specifically at
electricity generation and city distribution.
26 The first pillar consists of the exploitation―from exploration to distribution–of the
most significant domestic deposits in Xinjiang (Tarim Basin, 30 tcf to 40 tcf) and Inner
Mongolia (Ordos Basin, 16 tcf to 21 tcf) through the setting-up of intensive E&P works
and the West-East  Pipeline Project  (valued at  US$8.6  billion)  to  carry,  for  about  30
years, 1.2 tcf of gas per annum, the four thousand kilometres to Shanghai; and through
the expansion of  a  countrywide  pipeline  network linking smaller  deposits  to  other
main consumer centres.  Up to  July  2004,  PetroChina was  the  legitimate  nominated
leading force behind the first two operations (50%), associated to participation from
local rival Sinopec (5%) and major international players such as Gasprom, ExxonMobil
and Shell (each at 15%). 
27 The second pillar consists of discussion with Russia and the Central Asian republics of
the exploitation of the gigantic oil and gas reserves belonging to its rich neighbours.
Today four main projects are crucially pending. The first two are east Siberia projects:
one managed by a trio formed by TNK (Tyumen Oil)-BP (together as Russia Petroleum),
CNPC and South Korea’s Kogas backing the exploitation of Kovykta fields (50 tcf) near
Irkutsk. The project will link this part of Siberia to Manchuria and possibly South Korea
(via  an undersea route  from Dalian onwards)  through a  2,400-kilometre,  2.9  billion
cubic feet per day capacity of pipeline with total costs estimated at US$14 billion to
US$17  billion.  The  second  is  a  parallel route  project  under  a  Memorandum  of
Understanding signed in July 2000 (and a general agreement in May 2003) for a Yukos-
CNPC US$150 billion partnership allowing about 750 million tons of oil to be shipped
from Angarsk to Daqing through a US$2.5 billion pipeline over the period between 2005
to 2030 (or about 30 millions tons a year equivalent to 5% to 10% of China’s yearly
average need). The third is the Kazakhstan project 24, being the exploitation by a jointly
owned  company  by  CNPC  and  a  Kazakh  state  oil  and  gas  company,  and  a  3,100-
kilometre pipeline delivering 20 million tons a year of oil to western China. The fourth
is the Sakhalin project to transport natural gas from the gigantic fields (operated by
Japanese and majors oil and gas companies) situated on those tiny Russian islands on
the northern tip of Japan to Harbin and Shenyang.
28 The third and final  pillar consists  of  the exploitation of  imported LNG through the
build-up of terminal facilities and grids around the terminals to feed gas-fired power
plants in addition to the securing of massive LNG reserves and supply contracts. Those
LNG projects are estimated to account for 8% of China oil and gas imports by 2010 25.
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South and costal China have been prioritised with one terminal project in Shenzhen
finally  negotiated (over 3  millions tons per year and a cost  of  US$600 million)  and
under construction (to be operational by 2006) while two others of similar size (most
probably in the Xiamen and Shanghai areas) are planned for 2010. Here as well the
logical China majority operator–CNOOC (both Corp. and Ltd.) is partnering with some
key international contributors and some local authorities (BP 30%, Guangdong province
31%  for  the  Shenzhen  project),  while  being  granted  three  important  international
concessions in both E&P fields and purchasing matters: a first US$20 billion 25-year
supply contract (70 million tons) from Indonesia’s BP-led Tangguh field associated with
a stake of 12.5% signed in 2002 (and subsequently raised early 2004 to 17%); and two
contracts (2002 and 2003) about US$17 billion US$20 billion each (25 years for 75 to 100
million  tons)  from  Australia’s  Northwest  Shelf  (Woodside  operated),  and  Gordon
(ChevronTexaco  operated)  fields  projects,  both  linked  to  participation  into  them
(respectively 5% and 17%). 
29 In addition, beyond those three secured agreements, CNOOC also unveiled in early 2003
a  plan  to  build  a  2,100-kilometre  pipeline  linking  those  LNG  terminals  and  the
PetroChina  West-East  pipeline  along  a  Shanghai-Fuzhou-Shenzhen-Guangxi  coastal
route. Sinopec is talking too about building a fourth LNG project in Shandong province
26 while PetroChina is studying another Shanghai terminal 27.
30 The globalisation process embedded in these three-pillar strategy and implementation
practices, and the positive and negative implications, are outlined here.
 
The Chinese pipelines network
31 On  the  positive  side,  the  mutual  and  complementary  interests  together  with  the
strengths and weaknesses of both domestic and international partners are taken into
account when building joint-venture schemes. The above projects are built on alliances
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between some of the best possible partners following intensive bidding and negotiation
processes. It is for example well acknowledged that the hardware- and software-related
technologies offered by the majors to PetroChina in the West-East Pipeline Project are
crucial  to  the  project’s  success;  as  the  LNG  supply  contracts  are  to  the  LNG  field
developments. These deals are formulated as any serious business enterprise following
orthodox economics free from domestic institutionalised rulings and practices. 
32 At the same time, this new approach of applied global practice leads to an inevitable
series of hurdles and integration into a “foreign” context–consideration of matters of
economy of scale, financing, resolving mismatches between partners’ strategic plans,
and  competitive  alternatives,  which  have  had  a  fundamental  impact  on  project
operations and to some extent even their existence. From initial stretched feasibility
studies and delayed constructions work–only the west-east pipeline is well advanced
and due for completion by end of 2005–, each of the projects has its globalisation-led
obstacles.  Yet  even  the  west-east  pipeline  has  faced  ongoing  unresolved  pricing
regulation and fixing debates, leading finally to the withdrawal of all foreign parties for
disapproval of the latest economics offered 28. As for the Russia and Central Asia oil and
gas pipelines, both the agreeing and structuring of a joint pool of resources, as well as
the setting-up of an organisation system from state down to every-day operations level,
are pending. In addition, some geo-political and alternative business negotiations are
working  against  the  interests  of  those  projects  by  highlighting  other  Central  Asia
pipelines routes under discussion (such as the US$3.6 billion Azerbaijan Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan or  hypothetical  Iranian line),  and their  partners.  In  particular,  the indirect
influence of the United States and Japan’s competitive and aggressive courting of the
Russian reservoirs, for identical strategic supply reasons, are making themselves felt.
The Japanese counter-proposal for an east Siberia oil pipeline route (to Nakhodka port
on the Sea of Japan despite being substantially longer–about 50%–and twice as costly)
supported by Russia state-owned monopoly firm Transneft, is antagonising the PRC-led
projects with some success.  The latest  news suggests that Russia would opt for the
Japanese route29.
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Henan mine in 2001. China is word leader in production and consumption of coal
© Imaginechina
Electricity–a “mixed context” process
33 The  final  contributor  to  China’s  primary  energy  supply–electricity  (nuclear  and
hydropower) and biomass–accounts for a small 3% of the whole, and should grow to
about 4.5% by 2020. Its globalisation process can be viewed as a synthetic mix of the
three. A low-context process is typified by the setting-up of gigantic engineering works,
nationalistic  ego and a fixed assets booster such as the Three Gorges Dam Project–
controversial from many points of view and built largely to typical local economics,
safety and performance standards.
 
Energy and Globalisation: Oil and Gas in China
China Perspectives, 54 | July- August 2004
9
Majors’ investments in oil and gas in China (existing and projects), 1990-2005
NB: Investments with relation to indicative end-2003 capital expenditures and market capitalisation.
Including all before cancellation and/or sale. Excluding ChevronTexaco only marginally involved in E&P
offshore.
* E&P = exploration and production. **The corresponding amount are included in the total.
Sources: Websites of ExxonMobil (www.exxon.com), of Shell (www.shell.com), of BP (www.bp.com)
and of Total (www.total.com) under “investor relations” heading (consultations of February 2003);
personal ﬁles and aggregation.
34 Medium-context  would  be  the  painful  restructuring  process  of  the  electricity
production  and  distribution  sectors  initiated  in  the  late  1990s,  exemplified  by  the
dismantling of the State Power Corporation–split into five generating assets companies
strictly separated from transmission and distribution–; as well as by the plan to unify
all regional grids into a national grid, as for the pricing system 30 and the announced
tentative policy of allowing in private capital 31. A high-context picture emerges in the
nuclear industry: few existing units have been built under all but solid international
practices  and  its  plan  to  expand its  stock  quite  significantly  is  to  follow a  similar
pattern of criteria. 
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Daqing – once the main oil-producing region, now in decline
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35 Overall, China is in conclusion a relatively global player, in evolution, moving within
two decades from a completely self-sufficient, isolated and “a-global” position, to an
integrated and interconnected power player with a definite character, although this
status is largely pro-active upon necessity and still secluded within a relatively small
percentage of its total energy supply requirements.
The Chinese oil & gas industry facing the inner market and the outside world The 1998
shock therapy 
36 Applying four key material concepts–industry structure, competition, technology and
price-setting mechanisms to China’s domestic oil and gas industry since the mid-1990s
to the present–, we will identify where transformation towards a market economy-led
globalisation stand with Chinese characteristics have occurred.
37 The  industry  picture  changed  fundamentally  from  1995  on,  with  emerging
restructuring efforts to merge and streamline a vast constellation of small to medium-
sized  oil  and  gas,  and  chemicals  downstream  operations  countrywide,  with  the
intention of forming regional coherent players. In particular to articulate some kind of
a  “Shanghai  chemicals  champion”  centred  around  Shanghai  Petrochemicals
Corporation–being the flagship company model and the most visible H-share company
floating on the Hong Kong stock market in that particular sector. The major change
among  all  which  followed  happened  in  1998,  when  the  entire  industry  was  fully
restructured under a territory-based split between three giant companies: CNPC in the
north and west (12 provinces) with the majority of oil and gas reserves, Sinopec Group
in the south and east (19 provinces) with the bulk of the refining and chemicals assets,
and CNOOC keeping its  almost  monopolistic  off-shore  perimeter  intact  32.  Although
clearly motivated by more than purely business motives, this comprehensive shake-up
has produced a basic industry structure, to date the closest to “global” dimensions.
38 The major impact has been the emergence of a real competition phenomenon between
and among CNPC and Sinopec affiliates, specifically significant on two distinct grounds:
manufacturing  and  technology-led  on  one  side  through  substantial  process  and
technical upgrades initiatives; and market and client-base dynamic through products,
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quality  improvements  and  uplifting  marketing  campaigns  for  market  share  and
predominance  in  their  respective  assigned  regions,  on  the  other.  After  decades  of
uncompetitive and old-fashioned practices,  the two companies are now aggressively
restructuring  their  assets  base,  implementing  production  enhancements  plans  and
using sales and marketing innovative tools, as much to set up programmes to improve
their cost structures as to attract a brand new customer base. Western-style battles for
market turf arose, to the point of requiring co-operation from archi-rival Taiwan China
Petroleum Corporation to strengthen business against rivals.
39 The pricing mechanisms have been similarly progressing towards a semi-liberalised
market value reflection from the same key 1998 reforms. In the oil sector, the setting-
up of a system coupling national references to internationally recognised quotes from
the Singapore market currently prevails–although subject to local amendments (prices
are  adjustable  within  a  one-month  period  and  come  under  regime  allowing
discriminatory power and control thus legitimising some disparities). Concomitantly,
the above-mentioned competitive field brought with it unprecedented price wars and
spot periods of undervalued prices. 
40 On  the  gas  scene,  the  public  policy-controlled  value  chain  system  has  undergone
several modifications to bring modern pricing methods integrating cost-structure type
, flexibility pricing and take-or-pay mechanism considerations into play.
The influence of the majors and the WTO 
41 Yet this reformulation of the industry falls short of three important characterisations
for  any  sustained  and  comprehensive  globalisation  platform:  good  distribution
networks and an efficient assets base closed to consumer markets; competition among
national and international players; and a fully deregulated market structure.
42 The first handicap lies in the Chinese industry legacies and the inadequacy between
supply  and  demand  zones: the  domestic  production  sites  and  facilities  being
disseminated and fractioned under a planned economy, often too concentrated into
politically-selected remote locations,  and furthermore often stuck in the old-regime
north-east industrial hubs. This unfortunate combination of those two negative factors
makes the whole industry ill-equipped to efficiently supply the booming consumption
areas  of  development  predominantly  situated  in  south  and  central  coastal  regions.
Additionally,  a  rustic  distribution  network  system  over-intensively  mobilised  to
support such a critical material flow towards the consumption zones is an additional
burden and creates deadlock. As a consequence this domestic consolidated industry
picture reflects  an outdated and far  from optimised business  model  distant  from a
proper configuration attached to the majority of  the Western world made of  a  few
albeit huge facilities built along the major coastal economic centres. These supply chain
deficiencies  are  well  understood by  the  Chinese  authorities  and massive  works  are
underway to slowly close the gaps. But it will take a minimum of two decades before
there can be any realistic opportunity of the system approaching typical “Western”
business models and thinking.
43 The second deficiency, linked to the first, is in the still marginal role and influences
played by the international companies as shown in Table 2. Whatever specific industry
sector visited, the international community holds a maximum of a small percentage of
all activities–about 5% of existing E&P oil & gas activities, a negligible part in refineries,
about  20%  in  small  oil  derivatives  such  as  lubricants,  and  a  negligible  part  in
petrochemicals–and  is  emerging  in  other  activities  (oil,  LNG,  petrol  stations,
Energy and Globalisation: Oil and Gas in China
China Perspectives, 54 | July- August 2004
12
petrochemicals).  Following decades  of  absence  and a  limited presence  in  the  1990s
through small investments, billions of US dollars are eventually spent by these majors
on setting-up state-of-the-art facilities. But the amount of investment spent in China
are still  insignificant compared to their  overall  capital  expenditure capabilities  and
their total enterprise value (considered as their market capitalisation). They are also
under restrictive domestic rulings: no foreign majority is allowed in big projects, being
all joint-ventures (JVs)33. 
44 This  experimental  phase  of  concrete  foreign  business  commitment  and  day-to-day
interactions within the local set-ups appears well engaged as far as initial construction
and  early  implementations  works  are  concerned.  But  lacks  any  evidence  of  solid
operational internationalisation practices.
45 The  third  deficiency  consists  of  the  prevailing  numerous  official  restrictions  and
regulations–such as import duties and a vast array of local taxes–as well as unofficial
prohibitive  practices–as  grey  imports,  false  re-exports  and  dubious  logistic
transactions–which all combined are still obstructing the free flow of merchandise and
limiting the scope of a fair and transparent competitive playing field. The WTO rulings
related to this particular industry have started to bring some platforms for changes
from 2002 onwards, with particular emphasis on two specific fronts: a progressive but
eventually sharp reduction of all import duties, forcibly eliminating to a large extent
the external official  protectionism, and a similar drastic opening-up of the internal
distribution system–from the progressive disappearance of quotas and licences for oil
and  derivatives  imports  (from  2004  onwards),  to  the  full  freedom  granted  to  any
retailing and wholesaling business (from 2005-6 onwards).
46 Although such  normative  impacts  are  occurring  well  in  advance  of  any  significant
transformations  in  the  everyday business  arena,  emerging strategic  moves  by  both
local and the international players, either to access, or to consolidate their position in,
the distribution network industry, as well as an intensive clean-up of notorious corrupt
import zones firmly indicate the will and determination to bring about change.
Domestic oil and gas companies, and international standardsPrivatisation as a trump
card
47 The integration of the Chinese industry within the international energy world has been
truly  formalised  through  the  listing  vehicles  of  the  three  national  companies,
PetroChina,  Sinopec  Corp  and  CNOOC  Ltd.  Following  the  major  1998  structural
changes–and  in  particular  the  principle  of  “separation  of  core  business  from  the
ancillary, good assets from the bad, and enterprise functions from the social”34,  the
three domestic entities quickly established a separate corpus with a similar goal:  to
create  three  champions,  firmly  under  their  national  shareholding  control  and
comprising their best assets and management, in order to be listed to raise fresh capital
under  optimised  circumstances  and with  the  ambition to  aggressively  pursue  their
restructuring (both in selective development and cost-cutting measures) as well as to
model their business profile and success to the best international peers. Accordingly,
PetroChina, Sinopec Corp and CNOOC Ltd were created late 1999 and early 2000, and
listed mid-2000 to early 2001 under a public offering of about 10% to 27% of free-float. 
48 Three years later,  a  comparison of some key performance parameters (see Table 3)
reveals as much success as failure. First of all, the co-existence of three companies is
not  sustainable  on  a  long-term  basis,  as  neither  is  big  enough  nor  sufficiently
“integrated”.  Nor do they offer the critical  size and locational  combination of E&P,
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downstream and chemical operations to optimise the value chains to be in a position to
become a true global player. Only a combined entity would have a significant chance of
standing as such–a 2003 aggregation of the three would for instance give a set-up in
line with BP. This is understood by the Chinese authorities, though little has been done
to achieve it 35.
49 Second, the major success of the three firms consists in having massively re-engineered
themselves  through  internal  and  external  processes.  Continuous  assets  swaps  and
offloading manoeuvres with their mother company and local municipalities, as well as
some implementation of international practices, have enabled them to stand among
the elitist list of the most competitive and efficient Chinese firms 36 and to currently
deliver financial performances in line with the majors and regional competitors (very
much  helped  though  by  the  2003  buoyant  international  and  domestic  oil  and  gas
scene).
50 Third, those successes cannot hide two major concerns: on one hand, their discounted
enterprise valuations as per latest market capitalisation amounts still stand 20% to 40%
lower than the majors; the explanation lies in the integration of an important risk and
sustainable financial performance premium associated with their unproven record of
continuous high-level profitability and a legitimate reserve about their ongoing tasks
achievement  towards  a  fully  streamlined cost  and revenue structure.  On the  other
hand, the non-negligible impact of huge burdens and liabilities matters at the three
head companies is taking its toll: matters such as a massive surplus of manpower 37,
multiple non-operational or under-utilised assets 38, and various hidden losses of local
SOEs. These problems are all only painfully slowly and partially being addressed.
Institutional comparison–encouraging signals
51 The  1998  rulings  are  the  starting  point  for  partial  but  significant  institutional
transformation towards global standards. From the macro-governance point of view,
important  structural  changes  have  been  achieved,  leading  today  to  a  two-head
authority  centre.  Tearing down decades  of  the  entire  energy industry  governed by
ministries,  an  initial  set-up  emerged  as  a  tentative  response,  comprising  the  three
players held strictly under a newly created central-core dedicated regulatory body: the
State Administration of Petroleum and Chemical Industries (SAPC), placed under the
authority  of  the  State  Economic  and  Trade  Commission  (SETC).  Following  the
dismantling  of  both  SETC  and  SDPC  in  2003,  and  their  replacement  by  the  State
Commission in Charge of  Development and Reform (SDRC),  an affiliated bureau–the
Energy Research Centre–took over the responsibilities of the SAPC together with the
Ministry of Commerce 39.
52 The  state-interventionism  observed  in  key  issues–such  as  strategic  overseas  E&P
campaigns, domestic policies on pricing changes, or appointment of top management
leaders–while keeping at bay day-to-day operations, appear to dominate this current
more market-oriented “light control” institutional scene. The SAPC could be compared
to a kind of solid state supervisory board to supervise and guide major industry debates
and competition between the three firms.
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Comparison of the three Chinese listed companies to one major and two regional references–
benchmarked key parameters 
NB: Best estimates=end 2003 data.
Sources: Websites of PetroChina (www.petrochina.com.cn), Sinopec (www.sinopec.com), CNOOC
(www.cnoocltd.com.cn), BP (www.bp.com), Petronas (www.petronas.com.my) and Yukos
(www.yukos.com) under “investor relations” heading (consultations of February 2003); personal ﬁles
and aggregation.
53 At the company level and in particular within their listed vehicles,  which are most
visible to and under international scrutiny, some apparent changes formalising strict
internal  corporate  governance  principles  and  moves  towards  decision-making
transparency and following market economy fundamentals are taking place.
54 The typical Western-applied managerial organisational “matrix system” (a combination
of geographical and operational hierarchy, both at local and headquarters levels) has
also been put in place gradually and seems to be having some success, although curbed
by the autonomous power linked to a large number of geographical-independent sites
of oil and chemical complexes which are for historical reasons run as semi-autonomous
kingdoms. Often enormous, representing a major economic force within their territory
and deeply embedded within the local institutional context, they tend to inhibit this
organisational optimisation.
A fight between old and new 
55 The business  and societal  concepts  of  consumer-driven production facilities  and of
responsible care were completely out of touch with any PRC market realities up to the
late  1990s.  China’s  oil  and gas industry  was  no exception.  The last  five  years  have
shown signs  that  such “alien”  concepts  are  being  recognised,  within  three  distinct
phenomena.
56 Firstly,  a  “Westernised  conscience”  is  slowly  taking  ground  within  a  class  of  well-
educated (often abroad) low to medium managers, in contact and at ease with such
“revolutionary” ideas. These managers are gradually introducing foreign practices and
developing innovations that aim to optimise production assets and delivering products
matching customer expectations. Although blocked by a wall of bureaucratic middle-
management, some of those changes are relayed by the top cadres, for the majority
highly competent, well-suited to the job and enthusiastic about their implementation.
57 Secondly,  this  action  and  reaction  link  between  those  two  managerial  layers  are
strengthened by a new corporate culture promoting a meritocracy, unfixing bit by bit
some strict hierarchy or salary habits unrelated to individual performance.
58 Thirdly,  companies’  responses  to  safety  and  societal  matters  have  been  evolving
towards substantiated responsibilities  becoming evident and a need for these to be
accepted and taken up by those companies. The Chongqing gas blast in December 2003,
involving  CNPC,  which  killed  243,  obliged  the  company  to  take  prompt  action  to
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guarantee compensation and a thorough investigation, and to sack local figures as well
as a top figure (intense pressure eventually forced the resignation of his president Ma
Fucai).  This  incident  stands as  a  good example of  current  expectations of  all  three
companies in terms of their obligations within a globalised industry, somewhere on a
long and strenuous journey towards comprehensive global capabilities.
59 More fundamentally, professional business research on this spectrum of globalisation
into  Chinese  corporations  authenticates  and  validates  five  qualifying  criteria40:  an
important  domestic  market,  high  ambition  to  become  a  leader,  a  global  corporate
governance  status,  operational  excellence  and  distinctive  capabilities.  PetroChina,
Sinopec and CNOOC meet the first two criteria, while the third is questionable and the
last two are not yet met. 
60 A  globalisation  process  then  seems  in  train:  solidly  initiated  through  sound  and
valuable structures, progressive and holding to modernisation principles validating key
market economy parameters, but still significantly far from any fully rational business
model. This rationality is seen as crucial to support the pursuit of its transformation,
which needs to become self-perpetuating, self-regulating and self-managed, and not so
much dictated by internal pressures and external circumstances.
NOTES
1. These three companies are officially state-owned enterprises, while their respective
listed vehicles–PetroChina, Sinopec Corp and CNOOC Ltd–are their partially but
majority-owned subsidiaries. The former companies are restructured entities from the
1998 reshuffle, while the later ones are newly emerged and set-up from the stock listing
process of 2000 and 2001.
2. These five are commonly denominated as majors on the business, consultancy and
banking scene and literature, and are defined as publicly-owned firms with a minimum
production of two millions of barrels of oil per day.
3. A standard banking and financing practice consisting of initiating a public-
ownership process from a private or state-owned enterprise through issuance of stocks.
4. Ulrich Steger (ed.), Discovering the new pattern of globalization, Ladenburg: Gottlieb
Daimler-und-Karl Benz-Stiftung, 1998.
5. John Child, “Theorizing about organization cross-nationally”, Advances in
International Comparative Management, Vol. 13, 2000, pp. 27-75. Child posits a triangular
inter-connected system that has an impact on a (cross-)national organisation or body;
this system is made of three spheres: material, institutional and ideational, each
consisting of different inputs, contingencies, capabilities, constraints and references in
relation with that organisation or body.
6. Ibid.
7. Mehmet Ogutcu, “Energy prospects and investments in China”, OECD Conference,
Xiamen, 2000 and International Energy Agency (IEA), China Worldwide Quest for Energy
Security, IEA Press, 1999.
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8. Four different sources are defined: solid (primarily coal), liquid (primarily oil),
gaseous (primarily natural gas), and others (primarily hydro-electric, nuclear and
biomass).
9. Data from George Murdock, China Energy Crisis, Dresser-Rand Business Development
Paper presentation in Hong Kong, 2000, and IEA, China Worldwide Quest for Energy
Security, IEA Press, 1999. 
10. K. Song, “China Huge Power Appetite”, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 18th
2003.
11. Financial Times, December 16th 2003.
12. A quota system aimed at restricting export volume during tightening supply
periods was to be in place by July 2004. South China Morning Post, January 24th 2004.
13. South China Morning Post, December 13th 2003 and Renmin Ribao, December 22nd
2003.
14. For every percentage-point growth in its economy, China is projected to register an
equal percentage growth in oil consumption. See G. Dietl, “Middle Kingdom and the
Middle-East: the energy connections”, China Brief, February 2003.
15. Experts speculate at best about an incremental growth of 2%; source: Arthur
Kroeber, “China‘s oil quest”, China Quarterly Review, March 2003.
16. With the notable exception of offshore business open to some co-operation since
the early 1980s.
17. Asian Wall Street Journal, January 20th 2004.
18. Financial Times reporting IEA data, January 21st 2004.
19. Pierre Noel, “Energie et relations internationales, Les Etats-Unis et la Chine”,
colloque Ifri, March 2003.
20. President Hu Jintao made his latest significant trip in January 2004―a ten-day tour
of Europe and Africa, including three important stop-overs in Gabon, Algeria and Egypt
to settle hydrocarbons deals. See: South China Morning Post, January 20th and 28th 2003, 
Wall Street Journal, February 6th 2004.
21. Sinochem (China International Chemicals Import & Export Corporation) being up to
recently the de facto state company officially in charge of oil and chemicals import and
export business.
22. Extracts and estimations out of UNCTAD, “China: an emerging FDI outward
investor”, E-Brief, December 2003.
23. Report on Energy in China, Citigroup Research, May 2004.
24. See D. Murphy, “Asia’s Pipelines Politics”, Far Eastern Economic Review, July 24th
2003; Arthur Kroeber, op. cit.; The Moscow Times, Financial Times, Asian Wall Street Journal,
various editions; and IAI, op. cit.
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29. Financial Times, May 12th 2004.
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china.html, January 2004.
31. The Standard, February 3rd 2004.
32. 2002 data indicate that CNPC holds 67% of total oil and gas production while
Sinopec holds 52% of all oil processing facilities and 66% of petrochemicals units
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(Ethylene). Sources: websites of CNPC (www.cnpc.com.cn ) and Sinopec Corp.
(www.sinopec.com) under company profile heading; and personal files.
33. Wholly-owned foreign enterprises are only allowed for small projects and forbidden
in some sectors.
34. Website of Sinopec Corp. (www.sinopec.com) under Investor Profile heading,
January 2004.
35. Moves in 2004 such as PetroChina trying to enter offshore business and CNOOC
refinery business indicate a preliminary shake-up in the direction of consolidation. See 
Financial Times, July 12th 2004.
36. Sinopec Corp was listed as the most competitive domestic-listed company in 2003
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. CNOOC Ltd figures among the best ever
credit-risk ranked company in China by Standard & Poor’s―BBB+ rating as good as
China’s long-term sovereign ranking. Sources: The Standard, September 23rd 2003, and
Standard & Poor’s, “China corporates upgraded following Sovereign action”, February
19th 2004.
37. Figures of over one million people under CNPC protection and its payroll are often
released. PetroChina has a workforce of 420,000 and CNOOC about 20,000. By
comparison, BP has 115,000 people and only a few thousand people to realise the same
turnover as CNOOC. Source: CNOOC websites (www.cnooc.com.cn) and BP
(www.bp.com); PetroChina annual results 2003, South China Morning Post, March 25th
2003; personal files.
38. SOEs like CNPC and Sinopec Group carry non-operational assets such as schools and
hospitals, and also hold a significant interest in old and inefficient factories or oil wells.
39. CEFC, “Review of Chinese Energy Strategy”, internal document, 2003.
40. Jonathan Woetzel (McKinsey), “Globalisation among Chinese corporations”,
seminar “The Chinese World: moving forward”, French Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, Hong Kong, November 2003.
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